We placed four Gemini 4 Argon agents in a sandboxed Minecraft survival world and gave them one goal: defeat the Ender Dragon. Each agent controlled a player via an open-source library called Mineflayer and coordinated with its teammates through in-game chat and shared memory. No

AI agents take actions through tools. Some actions are sensitive, so guards that supervise them must themselves be evaluated reliably. Yet the data used to evaluate a guard can include cues that make labels predictable without measuring the intended safety construct, and those cu

Organizations increasingly encode operational procedures as multi-step agent skills, here called Agent Operating Procedures (AOPs), that must be traceable, auditable, reproducible, access-controlled, and bounded in time and cost, requirements that regulated sectors make mandatory

Can AI agents organize scientific investigations that lead to well-supported conclusions? To evaluate this capability, we introduce PhysClosureBench, a benchmark of 50 expert-verified, goal-specified research tasks spanning strong-field, attosecond, and neighboring physics areas.

The Agent Status Protocol (ASP) defines a lightweight way for heterogeneous AI agents to report their operational state to a status server, and for observers such as dashboards to receive that state as soon as it changes. Agents push small JSON events over HTTP POST; the server e

When humans collaborate with AI agents on long-horizon tasks, what happens to the agents' contributions? For solving long-horizon tasks, humans place greater importance on ongoing interaction with AI agents (e.g., revising plans) than on an agent's ability to complete the task in

Computational biologists increasingly delegate substantial analyses to AI agents in long-horizon, multi-turn sessions, yet most benchmarks of agents' bioinformatics capabilities pose a single short task with a single-shot prompt. We present OmicsBench, a long-horizon, multi-turn

AI agents now pause for approval before they send money, delete files or email outsiders, and that approval is usually treated as a second factor. We argue it is one only when compromising the agent cannot produce it and when it names exactly what it approves, and we test both co