As large language models (LLMs) move from standalone assistants into agentic workflows, evaluation must extend beyond scalar leaderboard accuracy to account for operational reliability, cost, latency, and token efficiency. We use an agentic ensemble of small language models (SLMs

Contextual security defenses prevent AI agents from taking rogue actions by synthesizing a task-specific policy and enforcing it on the agent's tool calls. In multi-step tasks, however, which actions are valid often depends on what the agent has already done and learned. We prese

Evaluating AI agents on scientific research tasks is constrained by the time and resources required for the underlying experiments or calculations. In computational materials research, repeating the same expensive simulations across agents and trials can make evaluation impractic

People are increasingly delegating tasks to AI agents, and those agents are increasingly encountering other people's agents over shared resources such as a codebase, a calendar, or a budget. When each agent acts for a different user with different goals, coordination often fails,

When Isaac Newton discovered the law of gravitation, he did so through an iterative process of analyzing observed data such as planetary patterns, finding the underlying mechanisms by describing patterns in mathematical equations, and refining his theory against the Moon's orbit,

We study how AI agents discover and validate scientific formulas using a controlled case study of the hydrotope, a recently discovered geometric formula that combines the different polynomial pieces of nonlinear surface-wave scattering into one global expression. This problem is

Benchmarks, audits, and agent protocols describe performance, permissions, and repair, but not how observed evidence should change an agent's authority during a consequential task. We call this the assurance-transition gap. We propose a Runtime Assurance Contract (RAC), a policy-

Skills extend an agent's capabilities by injecting instructions and information into the context, and are widely used by agents such as OpenClaw and Claude Code. Prior work shows third-party marketplaces host malicious skills that give attackers direct influence over the victim's